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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:
:

MARIO A. SOTO,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20050089-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, a
third degree felony upon enhancement with priors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 416-44 (Supp. 2001), in the Seventh Judicial District, Emery County, the Honorable Bruce
K. Halliday presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Where defendant has not adequately identified or briefed the issues, should this
Court decline to address them?
No standard of review applies. Utah appellate courts have consistently held that
"a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A:

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-137 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with driving under the influence of alcohol
("DUI") for conduct occurring on July 13, 2001. Rl. At the time set for preliminary
hearing, he sought dismissal of the charge, arguing that the 2001 amendment to the DUI
statute, as applied to his pre-amendment DUIs, violated the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. R17-18; 97:2-5. Following briefing and argument, the trial
court issued a written memorandum decision granting defendant's motion to dismiss.
R75-79.
The State appealed the dismissal. R80. This Court reversed, holding that "the
2001 amendment of the DUI statute was not an ex post facto law." State v. Soto, 2003
UT App 382 (memorandum decision) (attached as Addendum B) (citing State v.
Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, 81 P.3d 775).
The trial court then recalled its order of dismissal and bound defendant over for
trial. R104A. Defendant moved again to dismiss, arguing among other things that
defendant's prior convictions were "based on records in a Justice Court of no Record,"
that "[t]he Court of no Record handles only 'petty offenses,'" that "[t]he lay
judge . . . need not be law trained," and that "DUI is no longer a 'petty offense.'" Rl 11,
116, 128, 139. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. R228, 234A. Defendant
subsequently entered a conditional plea of no contest, reserving the right to challenge the
trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. R244-247.
2

On January 19, 2005, the trial court announced judgment. R247A. On January
25, 2005, defendant filed his notice of appeal. R248. On February 1, 2005, the trial court
entered judgment. R253. The trial court imposed an indeterminate prison term not to
exceed five years and a $1500 fine. R254. The court, however, suspended the prison
term and placed defendant on probation for 36 months. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At five a.m. on July 13, 2001, Trooper David Brinkerhoff was driving home when
he saw a car being driven in a way that made him think the driver was impaired (R14;
97:5). The trooper stopped the car, found defendant in the driver's seat, and smelled
alcohol (R97:5). The trooper called for another officer because defendant was his nextdoor neighbor. Id. Sergeant Tom Harrison arrived, conducted field sobriety tests, and
concluded that defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Id.
Defendant was arrested, taken to the local police station, and given an intoxilyzer
test which showed a blood/alcohol content of .196. Id. Defendant was charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol. Rl. However, the class B misdemeanor was
subject to enhancement to a third degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44
(Supp. 2001) because defendant had two or more prior DUI convictions within the ten
years immediately preceding the charged offense. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i)
(Supp. 2001). Defendant had three prior DUI convictions entered respectively on
October 8, 1991, March 23, 1993, and March 5, 1996. Rl, 32, 44-45, 75; 97:5-6.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should decline to review defendant's claims on appeal because he has
not adequately identified or briefed any appellate issues.
To the extent that defendant's claims can be ascertained, they are without legal
support. Defendant's claim that the DUI statute does not allow the use of convictions
entered before July 1, 2001 to enhance convictions entered after July 1, 2001, is
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.
Defendant also cannot prevail on his claim that convictions entered injustice
courts cannot be used for enhancement purposes. While justice courts are not courts of
record, convictions entered injustice courts, like convictions entered in district courts, are
entitled to a presumption of regularity. While documentation of proceedings conducted
injustice courts may be minimal compared to the documentation of proceedings in
district courts, the unavailability of a more extensive record does not establish noncompliance with constitutional requirements, nor does it prevent the use of justice court
convictions for enhancement purposes.
Utah statutory law permits non-lawyers to serve as justice court judges and to
enter DUI convictions. It does not limit the use of DUI convictions for enhancement
purposes simply because a non-lawyer, serving as a justice court judge, entered them.
Finally, if defendant is attempting to argue any additional matters, he has not
articulated them with sufficient clarity to communicate the nature of his claims. The
State therefore cannot and does not address them.

4

ARGUMENT
L
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S
CLAIMS ON APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NEITHER
ADEQUATELY IDENTIFIED NOR ADEQUATELY BRIEFED THE
ISSUES
Under rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellate brief "must be
concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." Utah R. App. P. 24(j). "[A]
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, f 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quotations and
citations omitted). "An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall analysis of the
issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
court.'" Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, *{ 8, 995 P.2d 14 (quoting State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)).
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are
not adequately briefed." Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304. Under rule 24, the appellant's
argument "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just
bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based
on that authority. " Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305.

5

Defendant has not adequately identified or briefed any of his issues. Defendant's
statement of the issues on appeal merely asserts that he appeals from the judgment below.
Moreover, to the extent that defendant's claims can be extracted from his
argument section, they are inadequately briefed. Defendant's citation to precedent is
minimal. He has not developed his authority, and the cases that he does cite are
inapposite.
II.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE WITHOUT SUPPORT
The State has attempted to identify and address defendant's claims.1 The claims
so identified are, however, uniformly without legal support.
A.

The DUI statute permits the use of convictions entered before July 1, 2001 to
enhance offenses occurring after that date.
Defendant claims that "[t]he [DUI] statute does not address the use of prior

violations or convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 2001." Br. Appellant at 4. He
further claims that the statute does not "allow or condone the use of prior violations or
convictions to enhance any violation or conviction subsequent to July 1, 2001." Id.
Defendant was convicted of an offense occurring on July 13, 2001. The version of
the statute then in effect provided:

1

The defendant's brief of appellee in State v. Gonzales, 20040685-CA, raises
similar claims regarding the reach of the DUI statute and the propriety of enhancements
based on convictions entered injustice courts ("courts of no record") by non-lawyer
judges ("lay judges"). That case is now folly briefed and calendared for oral argument on
November 17, 2005. This Court's disposition of the legal issues in that case may control
its disposition of some, if not all, of the issues defendant raises here, assuming that this
Court reaches defendant's issues.
6

A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) [driving under the influence
of alcohol] is a third degree felony if it is committed:
(i)
within 10 years of two or more prior convictions under this section;
or
(ii)
at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under . . .
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1,
2001.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (Supp. 2001).
Defendant's claim is based on a misreading of the statute. A conviction for
driving under the influence of alcohol, which may constitute only a misdemeanor under
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3), is a felony under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) if it is
committed within 10 years of two or more prior convictions. Thus, any two DUI
convictions prior to the offense date can be used to enhance the offense so long as each
conviction was entered within ten years of the offense.
The prior DUI convictions in this case were entered on October 8, 1991, March
23, 1993, and March 5, 1996. Rl, 32, 44-45, 75; 97:5-6. Each of them can be used to
enhance the conviction for defendant's July 10, 2001 DUI offense because each was
entered within ten years of that date.
B.

Convictions entered in justice courts may be used for enhancement purposes
even though justice courts are not courts of record and even though justice
court judges may not be lawyers.
Defendant claims that the State may not "use the 'records' from [a] court of no

record to enhance the penalties of a certain crime." Br. Appellant at 6 (boldface and
capitalization omitted). He further claims that a non-lawyer judge "is not capable of

7

issuing a legal pronouncement of guilt which can be [used to] enhance[] [an offense] to a
felony." Id. at 5.
1.

Convictions entered in justice courts may be used for enhancement
purposes even though justice courts are not courts of record.

Defendant argues that the justice court is essentially a court of no record.
Defendant cannot and does not claim that the justice courts keep no records. Br.
Appellant at 5. He concedes that justice courts are required to keep certain records. Id. at
6. He argues, however, that a court of no record, by definition, cannot generate any
record with which a subsequent conviction may be enhanced. Id. at 5-6.
This argument fails in light of this Court's recent decision in State v. Ferguson,
2005 UT App 144, 111 P.3d 820, cert granted, September 19, 2005. Ferguson was
charged with a third degree felony based on his prior misdemeanor conviction for
violation of a protective order. Id. at Tf 2. The lower court granted Ferguson's motion to
quash the bindover on enhancement of the protective order violation, which left the
charge as a class A misdemeanor, and the State sought an interlocutory appeal. Id. at ^ 3.
On appeal, Ferguson claimed, in part, that the State bore the burden of establishing
whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in the prior plea
proceeding before using the prior conviction to enhance the subsequent charge to a third
degree felony. Id. atfflj20, 22. Neither party produced for use in the appeal a copy of
the transcript of the prior plea hearing, and Ferguson argued that the silence of the record
concerning whether he had waived his right to counsel, together with the certified copy of
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the prior misdemeanor conviction showing that he had appeared pro se at the plea
hearing, prevented any presumption of regularity from arising. Id. atfflf22-23, 27, n.3.
In rejecting Ferguson's argument, this Court, citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992),
stated that "'just because a record [of prior convictions] was unavailable, its
unavailability alone could not be used to show noncompliance [in the prior proceedings]
with well-established constitutional requirements."5 Ferguson, 2005 UT App 144, % 27.
In Parke, the United States Supreme Court had determined that there was "no
good reason to suspend the presumption of regularity" in a case in which "no transcripts
or other records of the earlier plea colloquies exist[ed] at all." 506 U.S. at 30. "[I]t defies
logic to presume from the mere unavailability of a transcript (assuming no allegation that
the unavailability is due to governmental misconduct) that the defendant was not advised
of his rights." Id.
Similarly, this Court in Ferguson held that the presumption of regularity still
attached in the face of a "silent" record, and Ferguson was required to "'produce a
transcript, testimony regarding taking of the plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative
evidence" in order to effectively rebut the presumption [of regularity].9" 2005 UT App
144, Ifij 30-31 (quoting State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, If 11, 68 P.3d 1035).
Ferguson controls here. The absence of a formal verbatim record of the
proceedings surrounding defendant's prior justice court convictions does not "suspend
the presumption of regularity" attendant to them nor does it otherwise prevent the use of
those convictions for enhancement purposes. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 29-31; Ferguson,
2005 UT App 144, \ 27. Thus, convictions entered injustice courts may be used for
9

enhancement purposes even though justice courts are not courts of record and do not
make verbatim recordings of proceedings. See Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95,ffl[12-13
(explicitly acknowledging that one of the prior convictions resulted from proceedings "in
the Springville Justice Court, which is not a court of record," and affirming the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss enhancement of DUI charges).
2.

Convictions entered in justice courts may be used for enhancement
purposes even though they may have been entered by a non-lawyer
judge.

Defendant claims that a lay judge is not capable of entering a conviction that can
be used to enhance a later offense to a felony. Br. Appellant at 5, 7-8.
Statutory law sets forth the requirements that a justice court judge must meet. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-137 (West 2004). A justice court judge is "not required to be
admitted to practice law in the state as a qualification to hold office." Id. at § 78-5137(3).
Statutory law also sets forth the kinds of cases over which a justice court judge
may preside. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104 (West 2004) (giving justice courts
jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions).
Statutory law also sets forth the kinds of convictions that may be used to enhance DUI
offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp. 2001) (permitting, without
limitation as to the court where the conviction was entered, the use of prior DUI
convictions for enhancement purposes); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (West 2004)
(same).
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Defendant does not contest the legislature's power to enact these statutes or their
constitutionality. Rather, defendant's claim, reduced to its essence, is that he disagrees
with the statutes or that he believes the legislative scheme is unwise. That claim,
however, is not cognizable. See State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, \ 15, 52 P.3d 1276
(stating that the courts "do not comment on the legislature's wisdom" in enacting
criminal statutes); State v. Herrerra, 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995) ("Even if a court
finds certain legislation unreasonable or unwise, that alone does not mean it has authority
to invalidate it.").
Thus, defendant cannot prevail on his claim that convictions entered injustice
courts by non-lawyer judges may not be used for enhancement purposes.
C.

Defendant's claim regarding an "error-free trial" cannot be ascertained from
his brief.
Defendant's argument includes a section titled "Error-Free Trial?" Br, Appellant

at 9 (boldface and additional capitalization omitted). Defendant suggests that justice
courts are "money making machine[s]." Id. at 10. The State cannot, however, further
ascertain the nature of defendant's claim and therefore cannot and does not address it.
D.

Defendant's claim regarding the status of DUI offenses as petty offenses
cannot be ascertained from his brief.
Defendant's argument also includes a section titled "Is DUI a Petty Offense?" Br.

Appellant at 10 (boldface and additional capitalization omitted). Defendant suggests that
DUI is no longer a petty offense. Id. at 10-11. This appears to be another variation on
defendant's claim that a conviction in a justice court cannot be used to enhance a
subsequent conviction in district court to a felony. The State has addressed that claim. If
11

defendant intends something more, the State cannot determine the nature of that
additional claim and therefore cannot and does not address it.
E.

If defendant's rehearsal of the history of jurisprudence, stare decisis, the
break from stare decisis, the English view, the doctrine of law, and officers of
the court is intended to raise a claim, the claim cannot be ascertained.
Defendant's argument section concludes with subsections addressing the history

of jurisprudence, stare decisis, the break from stare decisis, the English view, the doctrine
of law, and officers of the court. Br. Appellant at 12-16. If defendant intends to raise a
claim in any of these sections, the State cannot determine the nature of that claim and
therefore does not address it.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this */ day of

lyQsItUitfJLiw

, 2005.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

A

v^M-g^

ANNEB.INOUYE
sistant Attorney General
orneys for Appellee
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

U.CA 1953 §41-6-44
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Copyright © 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
41-6-44 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or
unsafe blood alcohol concentration -Measurement of blood or breath
alcohol -Criminal punishment -Arrest without warrant -Penalties —
Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in
accordance with Section 62A-8-107;
(b) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless
driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or
any district, possession, or territory of the United States which would
constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related reckless driving if
committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10
U.S.C. Sec. 815;
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance
with Section 62A-8-107;
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death;
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in
accordance with Section 62A-8-107;
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance
abuse program;
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance

similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41- 6-43; and
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two
hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the person has
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of
safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge
of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of
Subsection (2) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the
offense; or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age
in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48
consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require
the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 24
hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or
home confinement, the court shall:

(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does
not order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d);
and
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse
treatment is appropriate.
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level
of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in accordance
with Subsection (14).
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require
the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240
hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or
home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does
not order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (5)(d);
and
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse
treatment is appropriate.
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with
Subsection (14).
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree
felony if it is committed:
(i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after
July 1,2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1,
2001.
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of

a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours.
(c) For Subsection (6)(a) or (b), the court shall impose an order requiring
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through
after treatment for not less than 240 hours.
(d) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(b), the court
may require the person to participate in home confinement through the use
of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening
and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion of the
court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse
treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 416-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court, would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent
conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
(b) If a person fails to complete all court ordered screening and assessment,
educational series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails to pay all fines
and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs, the court shall
notify the Driver License Division of a failure to comply. Upon receiving
the notification, the division shall suspend the person's driving privilege in
accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3).
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute
for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not
there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by
the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether there

was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered
under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for the
first time under Subsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent
offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed within a period
often years from the date of the prior violation; and
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under
Subsection (12).
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based.
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those
persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a
specified period of time.
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law
enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts,
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the
person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be
monitored; and

(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other
specified location.
(d) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a
substance abuse testing instrument;
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the time
the person is subject to home confinement;
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to attend
school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly between
those activities and the person's home; and
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if the
person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider.
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by
the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv).
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e):
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation;
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation.
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation
provider.
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence,
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that
sentence or those conditions or orders.
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the
costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i).
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or
higher, then if the court does not order:
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(b)(iii),
then the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the record:

(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1;
1957, ch. 75, § 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, ch. 268, § 3;
1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, § 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13;
1983, ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, § 1; 1986, ch. 122, §
1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; 1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2; 1988,
ch. 17, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 16; 1990, ch. 299, § 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1;
1993, ch. 168, § 1; 1993, ch. 193, § 1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32; 1994, ch. 159, §
1; 1994, ch. 263, § 1; 1996, ch. 71, § 1; 1996, ch. 220, § 1; 1996, ch. 223, §
2; 1997, ch. 68, § 1; 1998, ch. 13, § 46; 1998, ch. 94, § 1; 1998, ch. 168, §
1; 1999, ch. 33, § 1; 1999, ch. 226, § 1; 1999, ch. 258, § 1; 2000, ch. 333, §
1; 2000, ch. 334, § 1; 2001, ch. 64, § 1; 2001, ch. 289, § 1; 2001, ch. 309, §
1; 2001, ch. 355, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. -The 1994 amendment by ch. 159, effective March 17,
1994, added Subsection (3)(a)(ii)(B), making related changes, and
substituted "Section 53-3-223" for "41-2-130" in Subsection (12)(b).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 263, effective May 2, 1994, subdivided
Subsection (12)(a), substituted "53-3-223" for "41-2-130" in Subsection
(12)(b), and made stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 220, effective April 29, 1996, deleted former
Subsections (6)(b) and (7) concerning punishments for third and fourth
convictions of driving under the influence; added Subsections (6)(a)(ii) and
(6)(c) making related redesignation and reference changes; in Subsection
(6)(a) added "or subsequent"; in Subsection (6)(a)(i) substituted "class A"
for "class B"; and made stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 71, effective July 1, 1996, added Subsections
(l)(a) and (13); redesignated former Subsection (1) as (2)(a) and (2)(b) and
former Subsection (2) as (2)(c); revised and redesignated former
Subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c) as Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c); in Subsection
(5)(a) substituted "If a person is convicted under Subsection (2)" for "Upon
a second conviction for a violation committed" and "conviction" for
"violation"; rewrote Subsections (6) and (7); in Subsections (9)(a)(i) and
(9)(a)(ii) deleted "that qualifies as a prior conviction" after "41-6-45";
deleted former Subsection (9)(b), relating to prior convictions, and
redesignated the following subsections accordingly; rewrote Subsections
(10)(b) and (10)(c); added Subsection (12)(a)(iii); and made stylistic

changes.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 223, effective July 1, 1996, deleted former
Subsection (7)(c)(ii) providing completion of an alcohol and drug
dependency rehabilitation program as an alternative to incarceration, and
redesignated former Subsection (7)(c)(i) as (7)(c); added Subsections
(4)(c)(ii) and (5)(c)(ii) making related redesignation changes; substituted
"all or part of a jail sentence" for "jail" throughout; in Subsection (6)(b)(i)
added "fine of not less than $900, but not more than $1,000 and a"; in
Subsection (6)(b)(iii) and (7)(d) added Tine"; in Subsection (6)(c)(i)
substituted "$2,000, but not more than $5,000" for "$1,000"; in Subsection
(7)(b) substituted "$3,000 but not more than $10,000" for "$1,000"; in
(7)(c) deleted "but only if the court enters in writing on the record the
reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail sentence"; and made
stylistic and related changes.
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, deleted maximum penalties
throughout Subsections (4) to (6), inserted the references to § 41-6-44.6
throughout Subsections (8) and (9), and made numerous stylistic changes.
The 1998 amendment by ch. 13, effective May 4, 1998, made minor
stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 1998 amendment by ch. 94, effective May 4, 1998, substituted
"compensatory-service" for "community-service" wherever it appeared in
the section; and made a minor stylistic change in Subsection (6)(b) and
(6)(c).
The 1998 amendment by ch. 168, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection
(l)(b), redesignating former Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) as (l)(c) and
(l)(d); redesignated Subsection (3) as (3)(a), redesignating the other
subsection designations accordingly; added Subsection (3)(b); and updated
the internal references in Subsections (6)(a)(i), (6)(b)(i), and (6)(c).
The 1999 amendment by ch. 226, effective May 3, 1999, deleted
Subsection (6)(a)(i), making class A misdemeanors an alternative
classification; deleted Subsections (6)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), relating to three
and two prior convictions, respectively; deleted former Subsection (6)(b),
relating to fines, jail sentences, and alternatives to jail sentences; inserted
"or 53-3-231" in Subsection (1 l)(b); and made designation and stylistic
changes.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 258, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote
Subsection (2)(a)(i), which read "has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given
within two hours after the alleged operation or physical control," and made
stylistic changes.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 33, effective July 1, 1999, added Subsections
(4)(b)(ii) and (5)(b)(ii), making related changes; inserted "or home
confinement" in Subsections (4)(c) and (5)(c); added Subsections (6)(d)

(Subsection (6)(c) in the reconciled version) and (13); and made related
changes throughout the section.
The 2000 amendment by ch. 333, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "a
substance abuse testing instrument" for "an alcohol detection breathalyzer"
in Subsection (13)(d)(i) and added Subsection (14) (Subsection (15) in the
reconciled version).
The 2000 amendment by ch. 334, effective May 1, 2000, rewrote the
section, adding providions for educational series, substance abuse
screenings and assessments, substance abuse treatment programs, and
supervised probation and added Subsection (14).
The 2001 amendment by ch. 64, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection
(6)(a), added the (i) designation, deleted "third or subsequent" before
"conviction," substituted "violation of Subsection (2)" for "violation,"
added Subsection (6)(a)(ii), and made stylistic changes.
The 2001 amendment by ch. 289, effective April 30, 2001, made the same
changes as ch. 64 and also substituted "ten years" for "six years" in
Subsections (5)(a), (6)(a)(i), and (1 l)(a)(ii).
The 2001 amendment by ch. 355, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection
(4)(e), added "(i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii)" and added
Subsection (4)(e)(ii) and in Subsection (14)(a) added the reference to
Section 41-6-44.6.
The 2001 amendment by ch. 309, effective July 1, 2001, added Subsection
(3)(a)(ii)(C) and inserted "or two years" in Subsection (12)(a).
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and
General Counsel.
Coordination clause.-Laws 1996, ch. 71, ch. 220, and ch. 223 all amended
this section. Chapter 220, § 3 directed that the amendments to Subsection
(6) in ch. 220 supersede the amendments to Subsections (6) and (7) in ch.
71; ch. 223, § 5 directed that the amendments to Subsection (6) in ch. 220
supersede the amendments to Subsections (6)(a), (6)(b), and (7) in ch. 223.
The amendment by Laws 1999, ch. 33 included changes in Subsection
(6)(b) similar to the changes made by that act in Subsections (4)(b) and
(5)(b), but ch. 33, § 3 directs that the passage of ch. 226 causes the
amendments to Subsection (6)(b) in ch. 33 to be deleted from the act.
Cross-References. -Assessment in addition to fine upon conviction, use for
drinking driver rehabilitation program, §§ 62A-8-302, 62A-8-303.
Assessments to fund intoxicated driver rehabilitation account, § 62 A-8303.
Automobile homicide, § 76-5-207.
Department of health to issue permits for drawing of blood, § 26-1-30.
Jurisdiction of juvenile court, §§ 78-3a-104, 78-3a-601.

Motorboat or vessel, operating under influence, § 73-18-12.1 et seq.
Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
UT ST §41-6-44

78-5-104. Jurisdiction.
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those
offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78, Chapter 6,
Small Claims Courts, if the defendant resides in or the debt arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the justice court.
Amended by Chapter 215, 1997 General Session
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78-5-137. Justice court judge eligibility — Mandatory retirement — Service after
retirement.
(1) A county justice court judge shall be:
(a) a citizen of the United States;
(b) 25 years of age or older;
(c) a resident of Utah for at least three years immediately preceding his appointment;
(d) a resident of the precinct for which chosen for at least six months immediately
preceding appointment; and
(e) a qualified voter of the precinct for which chosen.
(2) A municipal justice court judge shall be:
(a) a citizen of the United States;
(b) 25 years of age or older;
(c) a resident of Utah for at least three years immediately preceding appointment;
(d) a resident of the county in which the municipality is located or an adjacent county
for at least six months immediately preceding appointment; and
(e) a qualified voter of the county of residence.
(3) Justice court judges are not required to be admitted to practice law in the state as a
qualification to hold office but shall have at the minimum a diploma of graduation from
high school or its equivalent. This requirement does not apply to justice court judges
holding office on July 1, 1989, who successfully complete continuing education
requirements under Section 78-5-127.
(4) A justice court judge shall be a person who has demonstrated maturity of
judgment, integrity, and the ability to understand and apply appropriate law with
impartiality.
(5) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (b) and (c), a county or municipal justice
court judge shall retire upon attaining the age of 75 years.
(b) A county justice court judge serving on July 1, 1996, who is 75 years of age or
older on July 1, 1996, or who attains 75 years of age on or before the first Monday in
February 1999, may not be a candidate in the 1998 judicial retention elections and shall
retire on or before the first Monday in February 1999.
(c) A municipal justice court judge serving on July 1, 1996, who is 75 years of age or
older on July 1, 1996, or who attains 75 years of age on or before the first Monday in
February 2000, may not be reappointed and shall retire on or before the first Monday in
February 2000.
(6) (a) A justice court judge whose tenure in office has terminated due to retirement
and who is physically and mentally able to perform the duties of the office may hear a
case as prescribed by rule of the Supreme Court.
(b) The retired justice court judge shall take and subscribe an oath of office only upon
the first appointment. The retired justice court judge shall receive reasonable
compensation for services as set by local ordinance of the municipality or county.
Amended by Chapter 84, 1996 General Session
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Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for
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Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of a charge of driving
under the influence (DUI), a third degree felony given enhancement
for prior DUI convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2), (6) (a)

(Supp. 2001) . The State argues that the trial court improperly
dismissed the charge based on its conclusion that the 2001 amendment
to the DUI statute, as applied to Defendant's pre-amendment DUIs,
violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Because this case involves the same issue of statutory
interpretation, similar procedural history, and the same legal
counsel as in State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, we granted the
parties1 stipulated motion to consolidate the two cases for purposes
of oral argument. See Utah R. App. P. 3(b).
In Marshall, we held that the 2001 amendment to the DUI statute was
not an ex post facto law. See 2003 UT App 381 at 518. In light of our
holding in Marshall, the trial court's order dismissing Defendant's
third degree felony DUI charge is reversed, and the case is remanded
for such proceedings as may now be in order.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

